CERDI - Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International

• mon premier post
  [jeudi 27 novembre 2008 - 14:57:00]

  test

  
  par Cécile BATISSE

• Current Position
  [lundi 24 novembre 2008 - 15:19:00]

  Professor, Université d’Auvergne.

  Past Positions

  2007-2004: Associate Professor, CERDI, Université d’Auvergne(teaching: 200 h./year)

  2003-2002: Institut Universitaire Technologique d’Informatique, PRAG, Université d’Auvergne (teaching: 420h./year).            

  2002-1997: Université de Franche-Comté, Lecturer (teaching: 96 h./year).

  
  par Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI

• Education
  [lundi 24 novembre 2008 - 15:17:00]

  2008: Agrégation du Supérieur, national competition to become professor in a French university.

  2001-1997: PhD in Economics, Thesis Title: Federations and Secessions. An Economic Analysis of Political Fragmentation. Université de Franche-Comté, LIBRE (Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire Bisontin en Recherches Economiques).

  Jury: J.-M. Courtault, B. Crettez (Thesis Advisor), R. Deloche, H. Kempf (Referee), P. Pestieau (Referee).

  1997-1993: Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan, Economy and Management Department.

  1997-1996: University Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, Post-graduate qualification, which is a perequisite for PhD. Mathematical Economics and Econometrics.

  1996-1995: Competitive examination for posts on the teaching staff of universities. Economics, Management & Accounting (Agrégation).

  1995-1993: University Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, Master’s Degree and Bachelor’s Degree in economics, specialization in Business administration.

   

  
  par Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI

• Publications
  [lundi 24 novembre 2008 - 15:05:00]

   

  ·        2008, “On the Strategic Use of Representative Democracy in International Agreements,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, Forthcoming.
  uploads/sfCmsBlog/html/10/StrategicDelegation2008.pdf 

       

        We consider as endogenous the choice of the delegation rule in an international agreement between two countries. We study three potential types of delegation: strong, weak or no delegation, the latter case corresponding to direct democracy. We show that populations decide to bind themselves by delegating the national policy decision-making to a "powerful conservative representative", in order to improve their bargaining position. These non-cooperative behaviors of countries when they decide on their delegation rule induce negative political externalities between countries, which cancel the gains achieved by the internalization of economic externalities in the case of political integration. We then examine the consequences of ratification by referendum. We conclude that a Pareto improvement of the international agreement would be to incorporate an ex post referendum.
  
  Keywords: Delegation; International Agreements; Nash Bargaining Solution; Direct Democracy; Representative Democracy; Ratification; Referendum.
  JEL classification: D72; H77.

   

   

  ·        2008, “Working versus Schooling: the Impact of Social Expenditure,” (joint with Christopher Grigoriou, Université d’Auvergne), Recherches Economiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review, 74(1), 33-52.

        uploads/sfCmsBlog/html/10/ChildLabo07.pdf

   

        We develop a theoretical model where child labour results from a household's trade-off between sending a child to school or to work. Education is considered as a risky investment, since the survival of the child is not certain. We explore the effects of public expenditure on education and health on child labour. On the one hand, we establish that health expenditure reduces child labour more when child mortality rate is high. On the other hand, a moderate aversion to risk is a necessary condition for expenditure on education to have a positive effect on child labour. Our theoretical results are tested empirically on data from 66 developing countries between 1985 and 2000.

   

  
  Key-Words: child labour, education spending, health spending.
  Classification JEL : J20, K31, D60.

   

   

  ·        2007, “Secession and the limits of taxation: towards a theory of internal exit: Comment,” American Economic Review, 97(1), 534-537.

       uploads/sfCmsBlog/html/10/BuchananError07.pdf

   

  ·        2005, “Tax Compliance and Rank Dependent Expected Utility,” (joint with J.-L. Arcand, Université d’Auvergne), GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review, 30, pp. 57-69.

       uploads/sfCmsBlog/html/10/TAXRDEU2006.pdf

       Figures : uploads/sfCmsBlog/html/10/TaxEvasionRDEUFig.pdf

   

        Formulating the classic Allingham and Sandmo (1972) tax compliance problem under Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) provides a simple explanation for the "excess" level of full compliance observed in empirical studies, which standard Expected Utility (EU) theory is unable to explain. RDEU provides a compelling answer to this puzzle, without the need for the moral sentiments or stigma arguments that have recently been advanced in the literature. Formally, we show that the threshold audit probability or penalty rate at which full compliance becomes optimal for the decisionmaker are significantly lower under RDEU axiomatics than in the EU case, and that the optimal level of underreporting is lower under RDEU.  Numerical simulations using various parameterizations of the probability weighting function illustrate the large quantitative differences between the two models,  while a simulation of underreporting rates in the US over the past 50 years shows how RDEU can go some way towards explaining the tax-compliance puzzle.
  
  Keywords: Rank-dependent expected utility, tax-compliance
  
  JEL: D81, H26.

   

   

  ·        2004, « La fragmentation politique, une revue de la littérature », Revue Française d’Economie, 18(avril), pp. 193-223.

       uploads/sfCmsBlog/html/10/SecessionRevue04.pdf

   

       Cet article propose une revue de la littérature théorique abordant la question de la fragmentation politique. Nous présentons une formalisation simplifiée permettant de comparer les hypothèses et les apports des différents modèles théoriques recensés. L'hétérogénéité des électeurs-contribuables motive la fragmentation politique, alors que les économies d'échelle dans la production du bien public ou la mutualisation des risques économiques favorise l'unité politique. Cet article se conclut par une analyse normative du découpage politique.
  
  The purpose of this paper is to provide a survey on political fragmentation. We present a simple formalization which allows the confrontation of different assumptions choosen by the authors. The heterogeneity of voters induces political fragmentation, while scale economies in public good's production or risks mutualization favors political unity. A normative approach of the political fragmentation.concludes this article.
  
  Mots clé : bien public, vote, sécession, fédération.
  JEL : D2, H2, H7.

   

   

  ·        2001, « Une analyse économique de la sécession », Recherches Economiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review, 67(3), pp. 315-348.

       uploads/sfCmsBlog/html/10/SecessionEco02.pdf

   

       Cet article propose une analyse économique de la sécession. Il s'inspire des travaux d'Alesina et Spolaore (1997), de Berkowitz (1997) et de Bolton et Roland (1997). Le raisonnement mené au niveau des Etats est largement transférable aux collectivités locales (régions, villes,...). Le recours à une représentation spatiale de la population nous permet d'appréhender l'hétérogénéité des préférences individuelles en matière de bien public. Le pays est supposé divisé en deux régions. La décision de sécession résulte d'un arbitrage individuel entre pression fiscale et localisation du bien public local, cet arbitrage évoluant selon la taille et le découpage régional du pays. En l'absence de disparités de revenus, nous montrons que le centre, la plus grande des deux régions, est davantage enclin à l'indépendance. Une approche normative, en terme de surplus, conclut notre analyse en appréciant l'efficacité économique du processus démocratique. Il apparaît alors que toute sécession unilatérale réduit le bien-être des deux régions.
  
  The purpose of this article is to provide an economic analysis of secession. It can be viewed as an immediate successor of the works of Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Berkowitz (1997) and Bolton and Roland (1997). We use a spatial representation of the population to study the heterogeneity of individual's preference in public goods. In a two-region country, the size has two antagonist effects on individual utility. On one hand, as the country grows, the individual fiscal pressure goes down. And on the other hand, more and more people feel frustrated by the production of public good in an unique place, the capital. Without revenu disparities, we show the center prefers the secession. A normative view ends this analysis. We conclude that unilateral secession reduces the two-region welfare.
  
  Mots clé : bien public, referendum, sécession, union.
  JEL : D2, H2, H7.

  
  

   

   

  
  par Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI

• cours modélisation - magistère 2
  [mercredi 15 octobre 2008 - 17:17:00]

  le contenu des concours

  
  par Stéphane CALIPEL